Delivery of military equipment to Tanzania

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DELIVERY OF MILITARY MATERIAL TO TANZANIA

Belgium’s newspaper De Tijd announced on Saturday 13 December 2003 a Delcredere (Belgium’s Export credit agency) decision on 16 December 2003 to provide cover to the New Lachaussée company, which is part of Forrest George International, for the delivery of military material to Tanzania. The material will be used to built a ammunition factory in Mwanza, Tanzania (neaby the Victory lake). New Lachaussée, is active in the design, production and supply of integrated assembly units for the manufacture of machines producing ammunition for the infantry and detonators.

In a press-release on the 14th of December 2003, Jan Cappelle (Proyecto Gato) point out that it is not appropriate to support companies that are helping proliferate arms and ammunition in a conflict zone and particularly not at such a delicate stage in the transition towards peace: 1.There is evidence from the International Network on Small Arms (IANSA1) indicating that Tanzania has been one of the transit countries for illegal arms’ flows into the DRC. An official report from the US ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms the risk2: ‘(…) Some of the more frequently used African airfields transited by Butt and others include Entebbe, Goma, Kigali, and Luanda. African seaports used by arms traffickers include Aseb, Beira, Conakry, Dar-es-Salaam, Djibouti, Durban, Luanda, Merca, Mombasa, Monrovia, and, Nacala. After arrival, arms are forwarded to their destination by road, rail, air, or ferry. For example, shipments through Dar-es-Salaam normally are sent by rail to Mwanza, a port on Lake Victoria, and then loaded onto a ferry for Port Bell in southern Uganda or other regional destinations. (…)’ A big concern is that at least three million people have died in the DRC as a result of the conflict since 1998. The Ituri province in the eastern DRC has seen the worst of the conflict and that is where over 75 per cent of the killings have taken place and from where 90 per cent of the country’s internally displaced population have fled. 2.The delivery of military material to Tanzania without adequate safeguards contravene Council Regulation (EC) No 1727/2003 of 29 September 2003 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of the Democratic Republic of Congo3. Article 1 prohibits the provision of “financing and financial assistance, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts of the aforementioned, directly or indirectly, to any person, entity or body in the Democratic Republic of Congo”. 3.The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (June 1998) calls on Member States “not to allow exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflict” (Criterion Three). The Conventional Arms Exports Working Group – COARM – established by the EU Council of Ministers, in its latest report has also expressed concern about the consequences of uncontrolled flows and destabilising accumulations of arms and other military equipment and the proliferation of the technology and means to produce such equipment. “Member States have agreed that, when considering licence applications for the exports of controlled technology or goods for the purposes of production overseas of equipment on the Common List of military equipment, account will be taken of the potential use of the finished product in the country of production and of the risk that the finished product might be diverted or exported to an undesirable end-user.” (Journal officiel de l’Union europeene, 31.12.03). 4.In several public pronouncements, the Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, have shown leadership in calling upon the international community to make the restoration of peace in Central Africa a priority. The Belgian authorities undertake many positive initiatives to support the efforts of the governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of Burundi to end the conflict and pave the way for elections. Backing the delivery of military material (including technology and means to produce such equipment) to Tanzania are not compatible with the goals of the Belgian authorities. 5.A delivery of military material is in violation of Belgium’s weaponlaw, which stipulates that an export of military material may not intervene the initiatives of the Belgian autorities toward peace and stability. The Belgian Senate emphasised that "defederalisation" of Belgium’s weaponlaw (August 2003) would not intervene the goals of Belgians authorities toward peace and stability. Since the “defederalisation” in August 2003, the Flemish and Wallonian autoroties have to approve/ deny an import, transit or exportlicence. 6.Furthermore, at its April 2003 meeting, the OECD Working Party on Experts Credits and Credit Guarantees, which includes Delcredere, agreed that the export credit agencies would draw their clients’ attention to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, presumably in an effort to encourage them to adhere to its provisions. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises stipulates that (General Policies4) enterprises should take fully into account established policies in the countries in which they operate, and consider the views of other stakeholders. In this regard, enterprises should contribute to economic, social and environmental progress with a view to achieving sustainable development. As one of the 42 HIPC countries (Highly Indebted Poor Countries), a delivery of military material to Tanzania is not appropriate. Furthermore, the OECD agreed, after a G-7 top in Japan (2000), not to deliver export credits to non productive expenditures in HIPC countries. The Netherland’s autorities motivates (29.200 V, nr. 54 2003-04) “not to deliver non productive expenditures to development countries. Weapons are non productive expenditures.” 7.Tanzania ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child on 10 June 1991. Belgium ratified this Convention on 15 January 1992. This Convention is one of the most important international, juridictional intruments to protect the rights of childs. For the purposes of the Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years and is intended to protect children from the most exploitative and hazardous forms of child labor, including slavery, forced labor, child prostitution and work which jeopardizes the health, safety or morals of children. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child set 15 as the minimum age for military recruitment and participation in armed conflict. Many child soldiers remain in armed forces and groups in Congo (Human Rights Watch) and Tanzania (coalition to stop the use of Child soldiers5). Backing the delivery of military material (including technology and means to produce such equipment) to Tanzania are not compatible with the goals of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.

To prevent delivery of military material, a campaign needs focusing on blocking the licence. Peace organisations have tried blocking controversial deliveries of military material in the past (export to Nepal). None of the campaigns had positive results. To prevent delivery of military material, our strategy needed urgent and coordinated action, from the national to the European and international level. We organised and coordinated an international campaign, including sign-on letters to the Belgian Prime minister and Walloon Minister – President6, and protestcalls to non – Belgian embassies. Jointly with Pax Christi Flanders, Proyecto Gato organised and coordinated actions against the transaction in the European and Belgian parliaments. This included almost weekly questions in the parliament and a protestaction in Senate during visit of Kabila, president of DRCongo. We also met with governmental officials and had very frequent contacts with the media. Pax Christi Flanders coordinated ongoing meetings with other NGOs to support our campaign.

Members of the parliament also took initiatives. A senator of the leading political party started in a meeting with African delegations a sign on letter not to approve delivery of military material to Tanzania. And four members of the parliament (two from the leading political parties and two from the opposition) expressed their concerns in a open letter to the federal minister of Foreign Affairs.

Nevertheless our arguments, Delcredere’s board of directors awared the 8,86 million dollar insurance to New Lachaussée. They argued the “defederalisation” of the Belgian weaponlaw, which restricts Delcredere’s position only to study the technical aspect of the application and not the ethical aspects. But weekly questions in the parliament and pressure on the European level caused havoc in the federal government and the political parties. The federal minister of Foreign Affairs might have assured the director of New Lachaussée to suppor the delivery of military material to Tanzania – which have been confirmed by governmental officials – the minister responded on the NGO pressure by turning over his position. On 10 February, the minister of Foreign Affairs assured Jan Cappelle (Proyecto Gato) during a protestcall in the Senate that a delivery of military material is not appropriate as it will intervene his efforts to end the conflict in Central – Africa.

On 12 february 2004, the Wallon minister – president Van Cauwenberghe finally decided not to awared the licence. In his press – release, he regrets the leaks which have caused an enormous protestflow in Flanders.

One year later, in January 2005, we’ve been informed that the company New Lachaussee submitted a new case. The project was the same but additional measures have been taken into account to response on the critics from the NGOs, including numbering the ammunition and a 6-month trial period. The Government was prepared: they asked advice from a Brussels university. After our analysis of the this report, Pax Christi and Proyecto Gato decided to campaign against this deal. We have also been informed that the credit insurance from the export credit agency has been reactivated. This time, we got enormous support from the Federal minister of Foreign Affairs who opposed the deal. On June 23, 2005 the Belgian Government of the Walloon Region had to revoked the export license. However, Delcredere covered the deal, and was willing to pay out the losses. Proyecto Gato claimed administrative mistakes in the decision process, and after a press-release of the Flemish network on small arms, the minister suspended the credit insurance. The official version was that the minister felt bad about the deal and asked legal advice. The minister denied to make public this advice. There are rumours that Delcredere paid for the losses, but governmental officials deny this.

Jan Cappelle Proyecto Gato.

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