WRI homepage > Publications > The Broken Rifle > No.49, May 2001

The Broken Rifle

15th May 2001: International Conscientious Objectors' Day:

• Focus on Angola by Emanuel Matondo
• The distant war in Angola by Hein Möllers
• Appeal by Holden Roberto (former FNLA military leader)
• Human Rights Developments by Human Rights Watch
• War as a way of life by Rafael Marques
• Brilliant Affairs by Peter Kreysler and Elise Fried
• Crimes Against the Media from Freepress
• Angola: Refusing to bear arms from CONCODOC, Refusing to Bear Arms
• Child Soldiers: Angola report from Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
• Manifesto for Peace in Angola from Angolan civil society groups
• Iniciativa Angolana Antimilitarista para os Direitos Humanos

Focus on Angola

Emanuel Matondo

On this year's 15th of May, the International Conscientious Objectors Day, I would like to recall all the pacifists, antimilitarist activists and human rights defenders the impunity in which the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other acts of cruelty are still living today in Angola.

It was at the beginning of 1961, forty years ago, that the war burst out in Angola after more than five centuries of brutal Portuguese colonisation during which violent resistance as well as non-violent forms of opposing the colonial power were parts of daily life. The former fascist regime in Lisbon wasted all the resources of its own country and plundered the wealth of its colonies to keep by violent means the country that they considered as an overseas province of Portugal: Angola. Whereas three armed 'liberation' movements according to the military logic of the Portuguese colonialists fought against the colonial repression with weapons, certain groups in the Angolan society resisted by objecting military service or other forms of servitude and by acts of civil disobedience. Unfortunately until today these nonviolent forces were not taken into account in all the political analyses carried out about the role of the resistance that lead to the independence of Angola on 11 November 1975.

After independence, the same armed movements, which said that they were fighting for the liberation of the Angolan people from slavery, colonisation and brutal exploitation, be devoted automatically into a race for power without mercy, even at a time when the last Portuguese soldier had not yet left the country. The population paid a high price. Fourteen years of armed struggle against the Portuguese, who received support from NATO and other Western countries from the so called 'civilized world', were replaced by a civil war without precedent in the history of Angola. Two warlords, Jonas Savimbi of the UNITA rebel forces and Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the MPLA government, were converting their country into a house of deaths alive. The colonial slavery was replaced by the misery of the ongoing war and the population is still today taken as hostages by the different armed groups and mercenaries of a militaristic demagogy. For these groups the maintenance of power without sharing it, is the highest value in life, even higher than all the existing humanistic values.

I would like to mention here that the two armed Angolan groups where supported in their deathly enterprise by the two superpowers of the Cold War, with each their own militaristic ideology. By accepting the secret pact to be the representatives in Angola of the military-industrial complexes in the US and the former Soviet Union, the Angolan belligerents succeeded in misleading the international community with the idea that the majority of the Angolans where in favour of the militaristic option that they had chosen.

Three times, in 1974, 1992 and 1994, they accepted a peace agreement without implementing the peaceful solutions. Instead of disarming they continued and still continue to rearm their forces just to eliminate the 'enemy' by force. The real common enemy of all these groups is the great majority of the Angolan civil population in particular those who were forced to flee from their villages of origin into refugee camps.

Although the majority of the Angolan people expressed on many occasions their total refusal to solve this political conflict by military means, the option chosen by UNITA, MPLA and FLEC (in the Cabinda enclave) was and still is a military one. But also external powers and various countries behave like godfathers of crime in Angola, provoking war crimes and large suffering of innocent people by providing weapons, modern military hardware, military advisers, and even humanitarian aid stated to serve the civil population but rather to supply the various armed groups. With more than 15 million landmines spread over the whole territory of Angola the country is nearly uninhabitable or at least extremely dangerous to live in.

Many foreign countries are involved in either direct support of weapons to the Angolan belligerents, or by their secret diplomacy towards the Angolan government. Many of them make profit of the war by supplying weapons or by importing Angolan natural raw materials like diamonds and oil, the two main sources for keeping the war going.

Without forgetting the principal financial institutions (banks) and multinational companies who are backing and funding the warring parties in Angola. The list of companies directly or indirectly involved in the Angolan war is very long and not even exhaustive.

Since the beginning of the new open hostilities in December 1998, after a period of a temporary lull of arms, many men and women, and especially young people resist publicly against the war. The desire to find a nonviolent way out of the violence was expressed in the 'Manifesto for Peace', the pastoral letter of the Catholic bishops, as so many other initiatives and petitions signed by thousands of people in and outside Angola. However, those pacifist voices are confronted by a repression by the state without precedent, and with a lack of financial means to develop new ways towards peace.

The independent press, that plays a very important role in the nonviolent struggle, has quite often expressed its sympathy for deserters, conscientious objectors, pacifists and human rights activists, but is also found without resources and is discriminated by the major donors of development aid.

By doing so the international community is acting against the firm will of the majority of the Angolan population who is objecting the militaristic approach by refusing military service, expressing their conviction in favour of peace by means of writing ('Manifesto', July 1999) or by demonstrating in the streets. Those who do so have to face severe repression and are even killed. More that ever these brave people deserve the moral and financial support of all who love peace and justice, to find ways out of the violent circle of war in which Angola is kept as a prisoner by those in power.

For this reason I would like to launch a strong appeal to support the forces for peace in Angola at the next 15th of May actions. Not only by financial means, but also by focusing on Angola and the situation of the peace activists there. Knowing that the sponsors of the ongoing war in Angola (weapons, and civil support for the belligerent parties) are among the countries in the West where the most active peace groups are situated. Therefore the Angolan pacifists and human rights defenders are demanding their friends all over the world to put strong pressure on your governments and to inform the public opinion in your country on what is really going on in Angola and the involvement of the international community in that tragedy. All foreign support for the belligerent parties must come to an end so that a lasting peace may get a chance to develop. Especially the faith of the Angolan conscientious objectors and deserters in and outside the country should be a point of concern, as many are threatened with expulsion when they are seeking protection as political refugees in other countries. These people refuse to commit war crimes at the side of the warring parties in Angola.

With antimilitarist greetings for solidarity,
Emanuel Matondo D.
(Angolan conscientious objector, peace and human rights activist)

IAADH - (Angolan Antimilitarist Initiative for Human Rights)
Yorckstrasse 59, D-10965 Berlin Germany
e-mail: ari@ipn.de
http://www.snafu.de/~usp/iaadh.htm

The distant war in Angola

Hein Möllers

From the capital Luanda, it is barely two hours flight to Kuito, the metropolis of the central Angolan province Bie. Just a jump by plane. However, one feels like they are in another world on landing. A ruined landscape, since the city was bombarded in the spring of 1999 for weeks and came under artillery fire. There are bomb craters where Portuguese colonial style houses once stood. Children recite their lessons in the few schools that remain open, strangely enough left out by the bombing. Women trail from the refugee camps to the health stations like restless zombies, and on the way, wait outside the food stores. Confused and worn old women wear name ribbons on their wrists like new-borns so that they don't get lost. Almost all men are in uniform.

The only means of transportation is a jeep belonging to the humanitarian organisation World Food Programme (WFP), which the people pass on the way to the food storage. Nobody knows whether the storage will be enough to last until the rainy season when the runway becomes unusable.

People from all provinces stream to Kuito because there is a hospital here and there is emergency aid or simply protection from the extortions of the soldiers in a war in which the population are hunted and expelled from both sides. Over 100,000 refugees live in Kuito, as many as the city once had as inhabitants.

For years now the war in Angola has not been about parties and programmes. It is a bitter irony that it is from here that the fundamental changes in southern Africa began, in December 1988 when Angola and South Africa signed a ceasefire agreement in New York. One year after the withdrawal of the South Africans and Cubans from Angola, the path was paved for Namibia's independence. In 1990 in South Africa, the apartheid regime revised its politics and lifted the ban on the forbidden parties and released the political prisoners. In 1994, free, general elections followed.

The non-violent transitions of autocratic and dictatorial regimes in Zambia (1991) and Malawi (1994) are also closely related to the ceasefire of 1988, because this was the first expression of a change in global and regional politics. On the other side of the continent, in Mozambique, as in Angola, negotiations between the civil war parties began. They were brought to a conclusion with elections in 1994, which were followed by an improved economic situation in the country.

However, in 1992 the elections in Angola failed. The loser, Jonas Savimbi of the UNITA didn't acknowledge his defeat at the polls. Admittedly two years later, both sides, the reigning MPLA and the UNITA, signed a peace contract again in Lusaka in 1998. However the war continues regardless, the militaries have the power, and while old mines are cleared, new mines are laid. Every day 1,000 people die due to the war and the consequences of war, through mines, hunger and lack of medical supplies.

In Angola, where the process of change in southern Africa began, peace is still distant. The war that began as a liberation struggle in 1971, and with independence in 1975 turned into a war of rivalry between liberation organisations, continues, supported from allies in the East and West. It did not come to an end with the end of the Cold War. The basic patterns of social, political and economic polarisation, that originated in the period from 1975 to 1990, are still valid today: The MPLA against the UNITA, city against country, export oriented oil, and the diamond industry against the native farm and rural economy. The home market elites, that make a lot of money through shady deals, against an impoverished population, that uses a variety of strategies for survival.

As the war continues, however, it is more and more about just one thing: The division or acquisition of the loot has become the object of the Angolan war. The interests of the political elites of both sides, to continue with the extremely well paying deal have probably become the biggest individual obstacle to peace and national reconciliation.

The profits also finance the war that nurtures its masters. The government spends US$1million on the war every day. No figures are known for UNITA, but they are probably similar. As the government finances the war with petroleum, the UNITA finances it through diamonds from the north-east region of the country.

This all happens under the eyes of the international community, that doesn't show any serious political will to dry out the war. Even the weapons embargo of 1993 against the UNITA is not effectively controlled. The UNITA still receives extensive weapon deliveries from South Africa, the Republic and the DR. Congo, from Zambia and from Togo and Burkina Faso.

The government does not need to worry about supplies either. These businesses admittedly are not illegal, but they evade the spirit of the Lusaka accords and lead to dwindling trust in the peace process. The arms of the government troops come from Bulgaria, China, Israel, Ukraine and South Africa, from Belarus, and Brazil.

Russia too, one of the mediating powers in the so-called Troika, undermines its own credibility because it sells large quantities of heavy arms to the Angolan government. The Russian Federation has become the single most important weapon supplier. In February this year Spanish control authorities on the Canary Islands stopped a Ukrainian freighter carrying 636 tons of arms - from garnets to investigative tools - heading for Angola. It was declared as car parts. The arms had been ordered by the Angolan state company Simportex, from the Russian state business Rosvooruzheni, recently renamed Rosoboroneksport.

Portugal, also a Troika-member signed a military contract with Angola. Only the third partner, the USA, does not maintain any formal military relationships with Angola.

There are also hidden weapons purchases, financed from the oil deals.

As the oil price fell in 1998, drilling concession with a value of approximately US$870 million were sold to the oil-multinationals BP, Exxon and elf. In this situation only these big companies are technically and financially able to exploit the costly deep water projects. According to statements by the Angolan Secretary of State, the concessionary money was meant to be used "for the war". In April 2000 Angola and Slovakia signed an agreement on oil for arms. Six SU-22-bombers and T-72-tanks were among the purchases.

These weapons deals are only one indication of the disinterest of the international community in a solution to the conflict in Angola. The tragedy of the country cannot only be attributed to Angola's political class, to which victims and perpetrators alike belong, but also to the international agencies, that are responsible for peace building and the observance of human rights. The British Angola expert Alex Vines speaks of the United Nations peace building process as a grotesque pantomime. Since the Lusaka accords were signed, Angola would come close to a play about war, but at the same time it would offer the stage for theatrical files about "peace", that alternated between tragedy and farce. Under-equipped, both with staff and financially, the United Nations were unable to control the ceasefire process or to steer it. Just the contrary.

Instead of disarmament, new arms streamed into the country. Instead of actually disarming soldiers and transferring them to monitored camps, only support staff came who were recruited by force, merely young men, unfit and discarded. Instead of demobilising the armies step-by-step on both sides, the reorganisation and new grouping of fighting units occurred with the addition of private mercenary troops. Instead of subordinating the entire Angolan territory to the sovereignty of a transition government in Luanda, which should also have included UNITA politicians and generals, the country remains separated as two nations, of which one only obeys the commands of the military headquarters of the UNITA. On top of all this, on the outskirts things depend neither on the government in Luanda nor on the UNITA headquarters, but rather on armed men, who happen to be there. Instead of freedom of movement for people and goods, a basic prerequisite for the simple Angolans, who engage in trade, want to go home or are job-hunting, there are still armed street blockades and effective captivity, because the widespread bandits force people into immobility. Not even to mention the military skirmishes and the deadly minefields.

A democratic poll, a peace contract, a strong UN presence, sanctions, occasional accelerating of the thumbscrew through the Pentagon, that of the US-Foreign Office, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other agencies in Washington - all this should withdraw the basis of the war, should once and for all end it. Admittedly until now in vain. The incompetence of the international community is especially visible in the monitoring of human right violations. It was conscious role, writes Vines, that the United Nations human rights department remained ineffective, in order not to endanger the so-called peace process. For him that is only another act that shows the lack of backbone in the United Nations, which worsened the already prevalent climate of disregard of civil rights as well as a widespread culture of impunity.

The matter-of-fact conclusion of Vines: "In the end it seems that despite repeated postponements, combined with UN sanctions against UNITA, no side is receptive to pressure from the United Nations or from elsewhere." The war in Angola has crossed the national borders long ago. Angolan troops have been in the DR. Congo since August 1998 to help the friendly head of state, Kabila. In the neighbouring Republic of Congo they brought a regime to power through a coup d'etat that is hostile to UNITA. With these interventions, they sought to control the supply routes to the UNITA.

From December 1999 until May 2000 the north of Namibia was a deployment area for Angolan troops against UNITA, with approval of the Namibian government. UNITA led vengeance attacks on Namibian settlements and army bases, cottages were set on fire and many villagers in the north fled southwards over the Botswanian border. Business life, only developed after independence in 1990, came to a halt, schools were closed. 7,000 people fled from the fights from southern Angola to central Namibia. Namibian troops intervened in the skirmishes on Angolan territory too.

Neighbouring Zambia also tried in vain to stay away from the inner-Angolan conflict. Over 180,000 Angolans found refuge there. "Many come mutilated from mines, some blind. Among them are many women and older people, who are no longer in any position to provide for themselves", the Zambian Secretary of State explained after an inspection of the border regions. UNITA units comb Zambia's border area again and again searching for young refugees suitable for fighting. The fights in Angola, like the ones in Congo, mark a worrying process of growing militarisation in southern Africa. A development, that, if it cannot be stopped soon, could convert all discussion of a regional development community and regional integration that began so hopefully, into wishful thinking. In Angola, the fights continue uncurtailed, shifting from conventional warfare to guerrilla tactics and downright positional wars. Every few months, new recruits get the call-up by radio. Approximately four million people of the approximate twelve million population are included directly in the war actions on a day to day basis.

In the meantime, two million are fleeing within the country and thousands have fled over the borders to neighbouring states.

One can hardly expect concessions or compromises from the leaders of either side; they profit too much from the war they maintain. As in many other countries, the population's hopes are now directed towards organisations of civil society, that are increasingly commenting more loudly. Towards churches, unions and independent media as sources of support to those suffering and as solvers of conflicts. A role they can play all the more easily, if they are acknowledged internationally.

Contact:
informationsstelle südliches Afrika (ISSA)
Königswinterer St. 116, 53227 Bonn,
Phone +49-228-464369,
fax,: +49-228-468177
Email: issa@comlink.org

Appeal!

Fellow countrymen of the Government Armed Forces - FAA

Fellow countrymen of the UNITA Rebel Forces - FALA

Fellow countrymen of the Cabinda Independentist Forces - FLEC's

I, Holden Roberto,

As an old man (mais velho), pioneer of the national struggle for the liberation of Angola, call upon you, as patriots, to depose your weapons to end the self-destruction that the protracted useless and senseless war is causing to Angola, since 1975.

I call upon you, on behalf of the war-ravaged country, to think - with love - on your mothers, sisters and children who do not cease to cry out. Every day, they die unjustly and you too.

The brave and heroic soldiers who defend the people do not kill their own people, as unfortunately it is happening.

Let us, thereby, dialogue and discuss all our problems, differences and grievances, as brothers, sisters and children of this country - Angola. Let us sit down under a shady tree, as our old African tradition demands.

Please, let us cease with the vandalism and stop being the executors of our own people. I hope that this appeal, that I address to you, with highest sense of fraternity and patriotism, will deserve you outmost attention.

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

Thank you,

Luanda, January 19 2001.

Human Rights Developments

Human Rights Watch

Angola's civil war continued. There was little sign of greater respect for human rights as the violations of the laws of war for which this conflict has been notable continued. Both the government and the rebels, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), have been responsible for these violations. The number of internally displaced persons grew to an estimated 2.5 million, approximately 20 percent of the total population of Angola. Road access remained restricted throughout the country; only coastal roads and routes within security perimeters of major provincial cities were usable by humanitarian agencies. More than 70 percent of all humanitarian assistance was delivered by air because of insecurity on the roads.

An Angolan army counteroffensive pushed UNITA out of its strongholds in the central highlands of Angola in late 1999. In late October 1999, the government showed film footage of its control of the important UNITA bases at Bailundo and Andulo. Throughout late 1999 and for the first four months of 2000, the government continued to enjoy a string of successes. On December 24, government forces captured UNITA's former headquarters at Jamba. The government claimed that it had captured 200 UNITA soldiers during the fighting. It said 400 had been cap-tured during fighting for Calai, which was taken by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) on December 10. The government claimed to have destroyed more than 80 percent of its fighting capacity, while seizing 15,000 tons of weapons, munitions, twenty-seven tanks, seven artillery em-placements, thirty missiles, and other equipment from the rebels.

During the first quarter of 2000, the government appeared to be in the ascendance on the battlefield and UNITA appeared disoriented, its actions limited to sporadic guerrilla attacks. As the year progressed, this changed, with UNITA adapting back to guerrilla attacks and high-profile hit-and-run ambushes on main roads. On April 30, a U.N. World Food Program convoy was attacked 85 kilo-meters inland from Lobito, in an area supposedly cleared of UNITA forces. The identity of the attackers remained in doubt.

The level of UNITA violence against civilians increased significantly as UNITA's tactics changed during the year. In January, as the FAA approached Chinguar town, UNITA embarked upon a killing spree, aimed at ensuring that residents would not be captured by government forces. Some 140 soldiers and civilians were reportedly killed. UNITA was also reportedly responsible for extrajudicial executions in localities such as Camaxilo in Lunda Norte, Katchiungo in Huambo, and Quimbele in Uige.

Deliberate mutilations have not been commonplace in the Angolan conflict, but the number of incidents increased during the year, with UNITA forces reportedly cutting off ears and hands. The purpose appears to have been to send a warning to others not to betray UNITA, or to attempt to flee to areas controlled by government forces. It was a response to the rebels' greater isolation and battlefield losses. Accounts of torture were not commonplace but were sufficient to suggest that the rebels used torture to attempt to extract information, especially from individuals thought to have military knowledge about the government's intentions.

UNITA increased its forcible recruitment of children and adults in its war effort. In ambushes on main roads, UNITA forces killed and looted, but also captured civilians and forced them to work for them. This appeared intended to compensate for the continued flight of people out of UNITA's grip, but violence and forced recruitment were also said to have been in retaliation for "not following orders," when UNITA demanded that residents abandon villages. Similarly, UNITA retaliated against villages who continued to cultivate land near areas that the government had recently taken over. Conscription of children continued to be commonplace with boys and girls as young as ten seized and trained as soldiers by the rebels.

Freedom of movement continued to be denied in all areas controlled by UNITA. A permit for travel even to the next village was demanded by those in command. In the central highlands, UNITA was also responsible for forced displacement as it lost or captured territory, and its forces continued to loot and destroy private property. Government officials, traditional authorities and aid workers were especially targeted during UNITA's operations. On August 9, the U.N. strongly condemned an armed attack on Catete which resulted in the deaths of a humanitarian worker and three other civilians.

After many months of negotiations, five Russian pilots were released at the Zambian border in June. However, UNITA officials said a British and a South African diamond mine worker missing after a UNITA attack in November 1998 were dead. On August 18 De Beersannounced it had suspended its diamond exploration at its site in Cambulo, Lunda Norte. The announcement followed an attack by UNITA on another diamond mine near Camafuca during which seven workers were abducted and a South African security consultant killed.

In September, an armed UNITA unit destroyed a Total/Elf/Fina oil well near Soyo, in the northwest of the country. Meanwhile, a faction of the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) kidnapped three Portuguese and Angolan nationals working for a construction company in Cabinda province.

There were numerous allegations of continued abuses by government forces, although these were fewer than those regarding UNITA. The government's late 1999 and early 2000 offensives included a scorched earth policy, burning villages and killing civilians, particularly in Cuando Cubango and Lunda Sul provinces. Government forces reportedly executed villagers. In at least one location in Lunda Sul, a mass grave that the government claimed was holding victims of UNITA's excesses was in all probability the result of systematic extrajudicial killings by the government.

In the central highlands, allegations of rape by government soldiers increased. Soldiers broke into houses and raped women, or raped women they encountered working in the fields. These occurrences were widespread near military camps. Rape was especially commonplace during batidas, house-to-house searches, when units arrived in an area, and ordered local people to collect food and non-food items for them and to help transport looted goods. Those who refused to do so were often beaten and sometimes raped. These searches and foraging operations were especially common in areas recently occupied or reoccupied by government forces, such as large areas of Bie, Huambo and Uige provinces. The U.N. reported that in June some army and local police elements were accused by local NGOs of perpetrating human rights abuses, including the killing of sus-pected UNITA sympathizers in Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje, and Moxico provinces.

The renewed conflict, and accompanying human rights abuses and violations of laws of war, were fueled by new flows of arms into the country, although arms purchases by the government significantly declined. Ukraine, Russia and Israel apparently remained the government's suppliers of choice. The Israel Aircraft Industries confirmed in May that it had exported weapons worth $86.5 million to Angola since 1997, including twenty-seven aircraft. The Slovak Republic delivered a number of military aircraft in early 2000 that were purchased through an oil-backed loan. In mid-September shipments of weapons from the Ukraine were unloaded at Luanda port.

A series of United Nations embargoes on UNITA remained in force, and the U.N.'s Security Council's Sanctions Committee on Angola produced a fifty-four-page report in March on UNITA sanctions-busting. It was put together by an independent ten-person Panel of Experts, mandated in May 1999 to investigate sanctions violations. The report contained detailed new information, including evidence that President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo and President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso were playing an important role in supporting UNITA. The report also documented claims that Rwanda was an important location for gunrunning and diamond trading with UNITA, and that its government had full knowledge of this and was providing protection. Libreville in Gabon has been an important refueling location for sanctions-busting planes after they had been inside UNITA areas. It was found that most of the weapons imported by UNITA were from Bulgaria. UNITA's arms were believed to be funded largely by the illicit trade in diamonds. It also appeared that UNITA has had a general aversion for banks and normal banking channels, although its leaders had used credit cards. As already noted, the Sanctions Committee found that air transport has been the lifeline to UNITA.

Both Angolan government troops and UNITA rebel forces continued to use antipersonnel mines. The number of mine victims was up sharply in 1999 (from 103 in 1998 to 185 in 1999 in Luena alone). There were worrying reports that Angolans trained in humanitarian demining had been employed to plant new mines.

In Luanda and along the coast, areas under government control, there was greater tolerance for discussions about rights, and a slight improvement in the observance of human rights by the police, but at the same time there was an ongoing campaign of harassment against independent journalists.

The privately owned media expanded its efforts throughout the year to inform Angolans about public affairs, criticize maladministration and corruption, and voice a variety of opinions. The government responded to these efforts by using powers under the law, and also by going beyond these powers, to stifle freedom of expression. In July, the government introduced a draft media bill that advocated harsh sentences for defamation.

At least six journalists were convicted of libel or defamation by government officials after November 1999 and faced possible imprisonment. At this writing, they were all awaiting the results of appeals. As in previous years, pretrial and trial procedures failed to conform to the requirements of international human rights law.

On December 10, the directors of Folha 8 and the privately owned weekly newspapers Agora and Actual, were ordered by the head of the Department of Selective Crimes in the National Department for Criminal Investigation (DNIC) to withhold stories they were about to publish. These concerned a report by the British organization Global Witness, saying the government had used its oil wealth corruptly. Folha 8 and Actual suppressed the text of the article, leaving blank pages, and Agora published an article approved by the DNIC, but was forbidden to mention the police action. In contrast, the government controlled media published detailed rejections of the Global Witness report.

The Luanda Provincial Court convicted journalists Rafael Marques and Aguiar dos Santos of defaming President dos Santos on March 31. Both were sentenced to six months' and three months' imprisonment respectively and asked to pay a large fine. Both were granted bail and have appealed their sentences.

Journalists outside Luanda suffered more. Isaias Soares in Malanje and Andre Mussamo and Isidoro Natalicio in Kwanza Norte province faced harassment. Mussamo was arrested in N'dalatando on December 2, held in incommunicado detention for two weeks, and detained for a further three months. He was put on trial on May 28 for obtaining "state secrets" and revealing them. He was acquitted on June 2.

On February 18, 2000, the opposition Angolan Party for Democratic Support and Progress (PADPA) led protests against a 1,600 percent rise in the price of fuel. The president and secretary general of PADPA were arrested and accused of not obtain-ing official permission to demonstrate although this is not required for a peaceful assembly under Angolan law. Despite the arrests, the demonstrators protested outside the Luanda Provincial Government buildings on February 23 and were dispersed by police who beat some of them. Police armed with rifles sur-rounded a second demonstration on February 24 and arrested ten of those present, including the leaders of two opposition parties. Many of the dem-onstrators were beaten, three of them badly. On February 25, the police apologized for the arrests. On March 11, there was another demonstration against the fuel price and against the authorities' attacks on freedom of expression and assembly. This demonstration proceeded peacefully and there were no arrests.

On March 29, the Episcopal Confer-ence of Catholic Bishops of Angola and São Tomé and Principe issued a pastoral letter appealing to the government not to dismiss dialogue and to grant a general amnesty in order to assist national reconciliation. The bishops also appealed for a greater respect for human rights. Angolan Church leaders have since continued to seek a negotiated peace. In June, they organized a march for peace that culminated in an open-air ecumenical service in Luanda with the participation of other members of civil society and of political parties, with the exception of the ruling party and government.

The churches' advocacy on this issue resulted in a slight shift in the government position on negotiations. On June 19, President dos Santos reaffirmed the validity of the Lusaka Protocol and indicated that UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and his sup-porters could be "forgiven" if they renounced war.

Former political prisoner, Rafael Marques, argues that no matter what the revelations about the role of oil and diamonds in the Angolan war, for the majority of Angolans they will be little more than excuses used to justify the carnage. The core issue is the right of the Angolan people to live in peace.

War as a way of life

Rafael Marques

Nowadays, the Angolan war has become silent-almost perfect for both the warmongers and the outsiders who profit from the death and destruction of the country. The Angolan war does not disturb public opinion any longer. It is an old and intractable affair. It causes indifference.

In a recent interview with the Catholic-run Radio Ecclesia, the Angolan minister of defence, Kundy Paihama, dismissed the civilian death toll of a rebel attack against the capital of the Northern province of Uíge. "If people don't die of war, they die of sickness anyway," said the minister, to justify that in war a person's life counts for very little, if not nothing. Such a statement did not trigger any public outcry-people are used to it. Angolan society is both structured as and revolves around a war system and a war mentality.

Conscription as class war

However, the first public signs of hope in changing this system appeared in January and February 1999 when a group of journalists denounced conscription as a discriminatory practice that sends only the children of the poor and unprivileged to the frontlines as cannon fodder. In consequence, four journalists were legally prosecuted and one beaten by a soldier.

During the same period, a group of 500 women took to the streets of the centre of the oil rich and secessionist-minded province of Cabinda [a tiny part of Angola seperated from the rest by a small strip of land controlled by the DR Congo], to protest against the conscription of their children-for a war they consider unjustifiable. As expected, the protesters were repressed. But after the demonstration only two young men volunteered to join the army. With timid steps, Angolan civil society is coming to terms with reality.

In June 1999 a group of people put out a peace manifesto that was signed by over 200 prominent members of Angolan civil society. It was attacked by the regime, which pressed some of the signatories to make public statements against the peace manifesto, as though they had been misled in signing it. However, the initiative has paved the way for a more progressive call for an internal and peaceful settlement of the war in Angola.

By the end of July 2001, the Catholic Church organised a Peace Congress that brought together the backbone of the fragile Angolan civil society. The call for a peaceful settlement and an internal solution involving civil society grew stronger and is now moving towards consensus among the people.

Credible representation

Nevertheless, the lack of credible and vocal leadership within civil society has long been the main factor hindering the raising of local and international awareness of the Angolan people's plight. Both the government and the rebel movement have long been symbols of war and oppression. Yet both seem to be the only representatives of the Angolan people that are capable of influencing international diplomacy in how to address Angola. Thus, the interests of the people that are beyond the government and UNITA's claims are still faceless to the world.

The Angolan conflict has been "de-humanised" over the years. The human, social and economic costs of the war have never been priority topics in the discussions on Angola. The cold war (1975-1989), the contesting of the general election results by Jonas Savimbi (1992-1994) and his lack of compliance with the Lusaka Protocol (1998 to date) are the international landmark arguments for the maintenance of war in the country.

Power struggle

In November 2000, the Angolan president, José Eduardo dos Santos, addressed the nation in celebration of 25 years of independence. "The current perspectives are encouraging as, first, the great military victories recently achieved have neutralised completely any threat of power being seized by force," he said. President dos Santos also added that the military actions were confined to certain regions, at a low intensity, and that they could no longer hinder the reconstruction and development of the country.

Dos Santos has been in power for 21 years, and so far his main objective in the war remains the same, to crush any scenario that challenges his power. On the other hand, for almost the same period of time, the UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi has been fighting for the opposite, to seize power by force.

Showing no mercy

The casualties of the Angolan 40 year old war (including 25 years of civil war) continue to mount at the same level as 15 or 20 years ago. But while the Angolan war is internationally recognised as the bloodiest and most sophisticated of the African wars, official statistics claim just 500,000 dead. Following the outbreak of the current phase of the war in October 1992, the United Nations reckoned that during 1993 over a 1000 people were dying every day. Thus, over 360,000 people must have perished in that period alone. Both contenders have never shown any mercy for their own country and their own people.

Dos Santos would not declare war against UNITA, in December 1998, without the tacit backing of the United Nations, and of the international powerhouses that, at the time, believed in a surgical military victory against Jonas Savimbi. Dos Santos, in fact, waged war on the grounds that UNITA was not complying with the Peace Agreement signed in 1994 in Lusaka, Zambia, in which it was obliged to hand over all the territory it occupied to the state administration.

Waging war to foster peace

One of the points missed in such a strategy is that there was only a peace process because the parties had agreed that there was no military solution to end the conflict.

So waging a war to foster the peace process was simply a grim joke. If the international intervention in the peace process was intended to end the war and bring about national reconciliation and democracy to the country, it has proved otherwise.

A case in point is the government's systematic violations of freedom of the press and of expression, as well as its scorn for the rule of law; they are evidence that what is at stake in Angola is not about the good of Angola and its people.

On 31 January 2001, a government soldier from the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), Francisco José Manuel, was executed in public, at an airstrip in the Southern Province of Cunene, for crashing the military vehicle he was driving. According to the soldier's wife, the chief of staff of the Operational Comand of Cunene, Colonel Álvaro António, gave the execution orders. His family witnessed the event as the firing squad emptied their machine guns into the soldier, ripping apart his body.

Since Angola does not have a death penalty law, nor was the victim of such a brutal murder tried, one would think that the authorities would have to distance themselves from this deed. No, it is unnecessary for them to do so, as long as oil keeps pumping out to buy international diplomatic support. There was no outcry, nor any reaction from the United Nations Human Rights Mission in Angola.

Business as usual

Currently, the Angolan war is also being addressed as a business matter. Since September 1997, the trade of Angolan gems has come into the spotlight as a crucial matter in resolving the conflict. On 23 September 1997, a United Nations official told the South African paper the Star that if the government and UNITA's private talks over diamond spoils succeeded, then "the normalisation of the country will happen immediately".

Sanctions were imposed against UNITA and mechanisms were put in place to cut UNITA's main source of revenues and force it back into compliance with the Lusaka Protocol. Whatever the effect of such efforts, the Angolans are in a far worse situation now than ever before.

A quarter of Angola's 12 million people have been displaced, while over a million and a half people desperately rely on international food aid. For the current school year, in the capital Luanda alone, the government has sent home over 40,000 children who were enrolled in the education system. War has never disturbed Luanda before.

Most of the presidentially sanctioned reconstruction and development is carried out in Luanda. According to the Ministry of Education statistics, over 70% of Angolan children of school age are already out of the school system. UNICEF estimates that half of the Angolan population is below the age of 15.

Since the release of the Global Witness Report on Angola, A Crude Awakening, in December 1999, the reputation of the oil industry in Angola has been tarnished and associated with the war. More recently, the government has been tainted with the revelations in French courts that it violated the international arms embargo in 1993 and 1994 by rearming itself, through murky oil deals.

A lack of transparency

Yet, nothing has changed. On 24 January 2001, a group of 25 leaders of a small political party, PADPA, staged a hunger strike in front of the presidential palace, to demand an explanation on the scandals. The Rapid Intervention Police tortured some of the demonstrators, arrested six of them, and threatened the president of the party, Carlos Leitão, with death. Once again, the government walked away, unaccountable for its brutality.

In Angola, there is very little thought paid by civil society to the role of diamonds and oil in fueling the war, because both the government and UNITA have never been transparent or accountable for any national income. No matter what the international findings are, and whatever recommendations are made on the role of such riches in the Angolan war, for the majority of Angolans they will be little more than excuses used to justify the carnage. The core issue still to be addressed in the "Angolan Problem" is the right of the Angolan people to live in peace and enjoy human dignity.

If the time spent in searching for political and economic explanations to address the war was spent in building up and encouraging new voices within society, to express the people's will, the Angolan conflict would no longer be a personal matter belonging to the warlords. It would take people into the streets to debate and discuss it. And that's how it should be.

Brilliant Affairs

Peter Kreysler and Elise Fried

Since its independence in 1975 Angola has been ravaged by a civil war, a war that will continue as long as both warring parties still have enough money to buy ever more weapons. Peter Kreysler and Elise Fried describe how they get this money.

The gentle hills next to Luanda's port reach to the shimmering blue Atlantic Ocean. The fresh sea breeze blows into the capital, which makes breathing possible in the biggest African black market with all its different odours.

The market is called "Roque Santeiro" from the so-called Brazilian sitcom, which was broadcast on Angolan television at the same time that the black market started secretly growing. Today 300,000 people do their daily business there. Globalization "African-style" makes it possible to get anything there, provided you have enough dollars. Not only goods for every day life; fridges or faithhealers, but also women, children, drugs, medicines, Russian airfighters or killers. Today even the Angolan Health Office is buying its medicines for the hospitals there. No wonder that raw diamonds from "Luena Norte", one of Angola's northern regions, where the opposition movement UNITA is in hiding, are also offered at the market.

We came to Angola to find out about the diamond business, which, besides petrol, might be the most important financial source for the unending Civil War. With respect to its natural resources Angola is the 4th richest country in the world. In the near future it could become one of the most important petrol producers in Africa. But despite, or because of, this wealth Angola is engaged in one of the bloodiest civil wars on the African continent, which has killed 500,000 people so far. As if this wasn't enough, the country is also involved in the Civil War of its northern neighbour, the Democratic Republic of Congo. And, no surprise at all, the war there is also about the power over the exploitation of natural resources. The contradictions between the country's potential and the real situation couldn't be wider apart. Even the Angolans have stopped analysing the conditions and structures for the eternal failure of productive development. They simply refer to "the situation" and if things are really bad they call them, still in a relaxed manner, "the confusion".

When the UN Security Council in New York decided once again to do something about this confusion, it put the blame on UNITA and imposed an embargo on the world-wide business with UNITA diamonds. It is estimated that UNITA has earned at least US$3.7 billion for its war reserves over the past four years. The Angolan government on the other hand receives its earnings from the petrol resources. The UN report reveals that a multitude of international arms and diamond dealers are involved in these affairs as well as many multinational companies. Even the half state-run French petrol producer, Elf-Aquitaine, made it into the headlines recently in the context of the French corruption scandals in which the Angolan President, José Eduardo Santos, was implied. No wonder that Angola is the most important weapons importer of the African continent.

Victor Vunge, an independent journalist, who has enough courage and good contacts to expose himself to dangerous situations, goes with me to the black market in search of the "Senegalese" who organise the illegal diamond traffic there. Next to me I hear a pig which has just been sold crying miserably. I can only recognise it by its cries and mouth, as it has been put into a sack. I'm standing there observing the pig being taken away in a wheelbarrow, when a man comes out of the shadows and addresses me in French. After a short discussion he understands what we want and gives us an address in the suburbs of Luanda. This is where most of the West Africans have their "business establishments". In between many people observe me and we feel we should leave before we get into serious trouble.

Even though the suburbs of Luanda expand around the capital in a chaotic manner we are able to find our next contact, Santiago Domulango. He has friends who dive for diamonds in the rivers of Luanda Norte. "We only have a rubber dinghy with a simple compressor. The diver puts a hose into his mouth and then tries with a riddle to collect as many stones as possible from the ground, then the riddle is pulled on the surface by a third man and put down again. What we get from the riverbeds is the best you can get and of course there are sometimes disputes - this is when the water turns red", he tells.

"Then we share our yield and the divers get most of it. We sell the stones to our middlemen. Most of the time they have licences to prospect, which they receive from the chiefs of the villages. But if it gets too public that the yield from the rivers is good, the military will soon know. They will come well equipped and organise a short military action; they will chase the Carimpierus, this is what we call the divers, away, in order to exploit the rivers themselves. Under these circumstances it is quite usual that people are killed, the survivors will try their luck elsewhere. The Carimpierus often have to dig deep holes into the dry riverbeds in order to be able to scrape the stones out of the hard riverbed. The simple supports for those diggings often break down in the rainy season when the soil gets more and more humid. As they can win so much these people take the risk and often pay with their lives". Then Santiago Domulango tells us that he doesn't want to be implied in the "confusion" of the illegal diamond traffic.

We go the Angolan corporate representation of De Beers. Many busy people are rushing through the dark corridors leaving red footprints from the clay outside on the slippery marble floor. It is the beginning of the week and everybody seems to rush hastily into his office, which means that he has to use the staircases. The multi-storey building doesn't have elevators and only every second office is useable. On the third floor we discover a huge hole in the wall. On the sixth floor a woman on her knees is patiently trying to wash away the red footprints of the employees. And from the tenth floor onwards the whole outlook changes. This is the residency of the world-wide company De Beers. Suddenly we are surrounded by strong steel doors, the incessant ringing of phones and the dead gaze of security cameras. The office is full of clean empty desks on which the raw diamonds were once classified. But De Beers doesn't buy diamonds in Angola any longer. There are many vacancies in the company. What we see could be anywhere in the world. Anne Pereira, De Beer's press officer, welcomes us. After a short while I discover that she has just one leg. She is one of the mine victims. Every day she has to get up to the 12th floor on those slippery marble stairs. Every day those people fight their way through the world. On the street I observe a woman, her two children in a cloth around her back, she is carrying two huge buckets full of drinking water of dubious quality. She walks up the hill on a street full of pot-holes. She's trying to avoid them without being hit by the cars. These people are moved by an energy which we have never observed. They are in the middle of a war, for which each Angolan family has paid with at least one dead or mutilated member. In order simply to get up a hill or onto the 12th floor of an office building they need to invest all their energy and concentration. This might be the reason why those people seem so relaxed, they might have got used to the war after all those years. Their ordinary, and in the same time crazy, life has become routine to them or as they would call it: "la situation".

In the afternoon Victor accompanies us to see the journalist Rafael Marques, one of Angola's most charismatic personalities. We meet him in his house next to the different international humanitarian organisations, which have their agencies there. This allows him to feel slightly protected against assaults at night. He welcomes us by telling us that he has just been condemned to six months in prison for his work. Six months in Angola can be very dangerous. I want to know whether or not it is dangerous for him to talk to us. With a friendly smile he replies: "Me and the whole country are already in a most dangerous situation. It can't be worse". Angola's only choice is between two devils. One of them is José Eduardo dos Santos, the president, the other one is Jonas Savimbi, the rebel leader. As the UNITA profits from the illegal diamonds, the generals of the MPLA government profit from their own diamond mines. Right now the government loses Angola's resources by selling the petrol claims from the coast of Angola to big international petrol groups. Nobody knows how much they get for them. There's no transparency in these affairs. It seems that most of the money is used to buy new weapons so that the military actions in Congo can be pursued. Furthermore, he tells us, "the government spent about 250 million on luxury cars over the last year. This is more than it spent on the entire public health sector. The luxury cars are used for buying parliamentarians, those from the opposition included. The people call the parliament, with all the German cars in the mud out the front of it, the Audi-torium."

Marques still believes in Angolans and hopes that they will soon have had enough of their tyrants. But still the interests are too much interwoven. "Multinationals like Chevron or Elf Aquitaine profit enormously from the Civil War. And the UN doesn't want to get involved, it believes it has done the right thing by implementing the embargo on the illegal diamond trafficking. But Angola is as dirty and muddy as our streets. And they'll have to dirty their hands to get things going again. But maybe one of the devils has to be defeated before we can get rid of the other one," he says thoughtfully.

The next day we finally meet Jonathan in Luanda. His father had owned a coffee plantation, but with the outbreak of the civil war the coffee market in Angola, in those days the third biggest coffee market world-wide, collapsed. Jonathan's father was lucky, because diamonds were found on his property. But it was only his son, who fully represents the younger generation, who started exploiting these diamonds. Soon he came to understand that it was pointless to sell them directly to the dealers of the state-owned ENDIAMA. We accompany him and his handful of diamonds on his way to the West African dealers. Next to the fence of Luanda's airport we see the first mud cottages of Luanda's suburbs. Here refugees from the whole country live next to the dealers, who, in the shadow of the general corruption, are free to do their businesses. In the distance we hear the sound of the Russian aircrafts which provide the population of the interior of the country with basic supplies.

The World Food Programme has to care for 1.5 million people daily, even though the country is a fertile one. Through decades of civil war the whole country is now studded with land mines and only a quarter of the soil can be used for agriculture. This is tragic because 50 years ago Angola was considered to be Africa's granary.

Jonathan and two dealers are talking privately in another room. During these long discussions the Senegalese offer us the traditional sweet peppermint tea. The others are talking in their local languages. Nobody really understands what is being dealt with right now. Half an hour later Jonathan and the other man return and seem to be satisfied.

Jonathan's goods are highly appreciated on the world market for their good quality. Especially by the diamond group De Beers, who control the world diamond trade and are only allowed to buy "conflict free diamonds" in an arrangement with the embargo imposed by the UN. But the diamonds which are prospected in the mines are of a much lower quality than the alluvial diamonds, the diamonds from the riverbeds, which are often prospected illegally. Tom Tweedy from De Beers had already told us in Johannesburg that the alluvial diamonds have a special purity and that they are highly desired in Antwerp's diamond market. "The Angolan government has to send supertankers filled with petrol to the industrialised nations, to collect enough money for the war, whereas the UNITA can transport their goods in small bags. The compressed value of these rare stones is only comparable to the value of plutonium. Sometimes I think they are as harmful as plutonium", says Tom Tweedy in an astonishingly self-critical tone. But with his next thought he concentrates on profit again: "Even though the river diamonds make up only 1% of the traded goods they have an influence on the whole business." Other representatives of this sector ask themselves whether the embargo is good policy. A recent report by the UN estimates that the UNITA alone sold illegal diamonds worth US$250 million. The UN should recognise that this approach, with a product as difficult to control as diamonds, might be wrong as the diamonds make up only a small portion of the whole spectrum of valuable natural resources".

Ninchendo, who speaks for the board of managers of DEBSWANA the world's biggest diamond mine, with its head office in peaceful, democratic Botswana is afraid that the boycotting of these so-called "bloody diamonds" will not only involve other troubled regions like Sierra Leone, Angola and Congo, but that it might be economically harmful to the young democracies in southern Africa, like Botswana, Namibia and South Africa as well. Like many African politicians he underlines another effective measure that would help to stop the never ending conflicts over natural resources on the African continent: "If the wars in Africa are ever to be stopped then there must be an embargo on weapons. But this would hurt the industrialised nations where the weapons are produced and no politician wants to risk jobs opportunities there".

Eli Hass, president of the Diamond Dealer Club in New York, describes the problem from the perspective of a diamond dealer: "The dealers are the interface. They buy the unpolished diamonds in Africa, bring them to polishers in Antwerp and then sell the polished diamonds to the ultimate consumers, the jewellers. If we are able to control the interface we'll be able to control the whole market. As soon as a stone is polished you can't say anything about its origin, it has no birthplace any longer. We'll try to control the interface. But with the results of the most recent UN report we can be sure that the UNITA has a huge amount of stones and our industry hides too many black sheep who are tempted by fast profit."

Before our flight back we get another impression of the country's contradictory character. We're being strictly controlled for what we don't take with us, a 50 Mio Quansa bill, which is worth approximately 50 cents. Our luggage is not checked. Everybody could have bought the 50 carat diamond which was offered to us by a teacher and we could have easily smuggled it through the airport. In this torn and ravaged country, where people have been fighting for their survival for decades now, controls are weak, especially when those shimmering tiny stones are concerned.

Crimes Against The Media

Freepress

Since early 1999, the government of Angola has used the resurgence of a 25-year-long civil war as a pretext for cracking down on peaceful dissent. More than 20 journalists, mainly from the independent media, have been detained and/or questioned concerning alleged deformation and/or crimes against the security of the state. Among the most egregious instances of abuse are the following:

• The murder of journalists Ricardo Malo (1995), Antonio Casimiro (1997), Feliciano Zau Bunga (1997), Samão Raberto (1998), Mauricio Cristávão (1998) remain unexplained by the government.
• A draft Angolan Press Law, made public in July 2000, has been branded by both local and international media organisations as an attempt to create a legal tool to muzzle the media. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), which conducted an analysis of the bill, the bill includes vague clauses that allow prison terms of up to eight years for publishing domestic or foreign articles that "discredit" the president or other officials. Another clause prevents defendants from presenting evidence to support their case in court.
• The Provincial and Supreme Court in Luanda on 11 December 2000 ordered the National Emigration Police to lift the travel restrictions imposed on journalists Rafael Marques, Aguiar dos Santos and Antonio Freitas. However, less than a day after the court's ruling, the border police on December 12 refused to allow Marques to leave the country and instead confiscated his passport. To date he has not received any response to his continued appeals for the return of his passport.
• On August 7, the provincial delegate at Social Communication (SC) in Malanje, Andre António da Costa, summoned journalist Isaias Soares to his office and demanded that the journalist bring all his archives and documents relating to his work as a journalist. The official demanded the documents to scrutinise them in the light of apparent charges being contemplated against Soares. Da Costa told the journalist that the provincial government would charge him for having revealed to Rádio Ecclésia, a Roman Catholic FM station in Luanda, that National Union for the Total Indepence of Angola (Unita) forces had attacked the municipality of Cacusa.
• Between 19 August and 6 September 2000 police interrogated at least seven journalists in the face of the government campaign to crack down on independent reporting about the civil war.
• On 24 June 2000 four armed men kidnapped the chief editor of Rádio Ecclésia, Jose Paula.
• On 21 June 2000 four armed men dressed in Angolan army uniforms attacked the Luanda office of the Voice of America (VoA).
• On 31 May 2000 André Mussamo, a journalist with state-owned National Radio of Angola, was found not guilty of revealing "state secrets". Mussamo has not been compensated by the state for the more than three months he spent in detention awaiting trial, nor for the resulting loss of his job and personal belongings.
• On 9 August 1999 police raided the studios of Radio Ecclesia, a Roman Catholic FM station in Luanda, while the station was re-broadcasting a BBC interview with Unita leader Jonas Savimbi. Police arrested a total of nine journalists in connection with this broadcast.
• On 1 June 1999 Minister of Social Communication Hendrik Vaal Neto threatened to shut down independent media that failed to support the government's war effort against the Unita rebel movement.
• On 29 April 1999 VoA reporter Josefo Lamberga was physically assaulted by an Angolan army corporal while researching an article on draft evasion.
• On 3 April 1999 William Tonet, editor of the independent newspaper Folha 8, was interrogated by state security officers in connection with articles in his newspaper that allegedly incited young men to evade military duty.
• On 11 January 1999 Radio Morena administrators, José Manuel Alberto and José Cabral Sande, were detained for 24 hours by Angolan security agents for re-broadcasting a Portuguese television interview with Unita Secretary-General Paulo Lukamba-Gato. On 25 January, José Cabral Sande was detained again - this time for 48 hours - before being released.

Angola: Refusing to bear arms

1 Conscription

Conscription is referred to in art. 152 of the 1992 Constitution, which states: "1. The defence of the country is the right and the highest and indeclinable duty of every citizen. 2. Military service is compulsory. The terms of its accomplishment are defined by law."

Before May 1991, when conscription was abandoned as part of the Bicesse peace process, it was regulated by Law no. 12/82 (Lei General do Servicio Militar). Conscription was re-introduced in 1993 and the 1982 Law on military service was replaced by Law 1/93 on 26 March 1993. [17] [16] [9]

military service

According to Law 1/93 only men between the ages of 20 and 45 can be called up. [17] [9]

Another source states that women aged 20 to 45 years may also be called up, but they are actually not recruited. [16]

Those over 30 serve only in the Reserve Force. [6]

Military service lasts for 3 years; but 4 years for higher ranks, and some may be retained longer. [1]

Military service lasts for 2 years in the army, 3 years in the navy and air force. [9]

A service without the use of arms seems possible. [8]

postponement and exemption

No information about this is available.

recruitment

According to a Ministry of Defence Decree no. 29/97, recruitment and incorporation into the armed forces may take place five times a year; two times for soldiers and three times for officers. The number of men to be annually incorporated will be fixed by the Council of Ministers (art. 4). [19]

March and September are the months for military recruitment. [7]

In June 1993 the conscription programme was intensified to recruit 10,000 youth, but three months later only 40 percent of that number had actually joined. Potential conscripts in government controlled regions showed a marked reluctance to join the armed forces. [9]

forced recruitment

Rusgas, the press-ganging of youth into joining the armed forces, were common practice before the 1 May 1991 peace agreement. When conscription was reintroduced in 1993, the forced recruitment campaigns were continued. There were several reports in 1994 that these campaigns consisted of press-ganging young boys into joining the armed forces. [10] [16]

Reports indicate that although the government has stopped sweeping Luanda city centre for recruits, recruitment still takes place in some suburbs and is widespread practice throughout the country. Often minors are recruited by force. Armed forces' commanders are reported to pay police officers to find new recruits, who can only avoid forced recruitment by paying a higher price. [18]

Despite the conscription age of 20, there are reports of children as young as 14 being forced to enlist. [5] [18]

2 Conscientious objection

The constitution does not mention an alternative to military service. Individuals who, for some reason, cannot participate in military service, have to apply to the Minister of Defence for exemption. [4]

Official sources in Angola suggest a substitute service is possible.

According to the Angolan government in 1994, "there are no problems with conscientious objection to military service in Angola. Those who refuse to bear arms are asked to serve in the administrative sector." [8]

According to the Chief of the General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, "art. 10 of the 1993 Law on Military Service lays down that conscientious objectors, including Jehovah's Witnesses, are not obliged to perform normal military service, but for the period of time intended for compulsory military service must perform community service. This service is performed in a civilian capacity and within a civilian regime in hospitals, civil construction companies and institutions providing relief and public assistance to the victims of catastrophes and natural disasters. In order to better regulate the community service performed by conscientious objectors, the Council of Ministers is debating the law on conscientious objection, with regard to the principles already laid down in the laws mentioned above. At present, conscientious objectors in the Angolan armed forces are no longer brought to trial, as the current law does not allow it; they perform Auxiliary Community Service, to which they consent. There is certainly no longer any kind of legal or illegal repression, as the officially recognised Directorate of the Church of Jehovah's Witnesses in Angola would be able to confirm." [7]

However, according to the Watch Tower, Jehovah's Witnesses are sometimes imprisoned. [21]

Also the British Section of Amnesty International stated in 1994 that there is no provision for conscientious objectors and no civilian alternative to military service. Those who object to conscription are punished by being sent to the most dangerous war zones without military training. [14]

3 Draft evasion and desertion

Draft evasion and desertion are punishable under the 28 January 1994 Military penal code (Lei dos Crimes Militares No. 4/94). Failing to perform military service is punishable by 3 days' to 2 years' imprisonment, after which a new call-up for military service may be issued (art. 29). [13]

Desertion in peacetime is punishable by 2 years' to 8 years' imprisonment. [13] [16] [7]

In wartime or during military operations the punishment may vary between 8 and 12 years' imprisonment. [13] [16]

amnesty

Several amnesty laws have been issued. On 12 July 1991 all who were draft evaders, conscientious objectors and deserters from before the signing of the 1 May 1991 peace treaty, were amnestied. [3]

Similarly, after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the 10 November 1994 amnesty law amnestied draft evaders and deserters from the period between 1 October 1992 and 20 November 1994. [17]

practice

It is not known whether amnesties have granted in practice.

According to the Angolan armed forces, prison sentences for deserters in practice never exceed 4 years. Once half the sentence has been served, prisoners are granted conditional release. [7]

A Human Rights Watch researcher noted in 1994 that this is just 'theory', and that the treatment in individual cases may vary, depending for example on the area or the particular army commander involved. There were massive desertions and the prisons were already too full. In practice deserters were often beaten up badly and re-conscripted. [11]

During the armed conflict draft evasion and desertion were often punished by sending the conscript to the war front. [12]

4 Forced recruitment by UNITA and FLEC

UNITA does not allow civilians to leave the UNITA controlled areas freely. [18]

It has been reported that the service in the UNITA forces is 'indefinite' and that deserters have been beaten up badly and re-conscripted. [11]

There is no information available about the recruitment practices of the factions of the Liberation Front of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC). The FLEC are responsible for terrorist attacks. [15]

6 Annual statistics

The armed forces of Angola comprise about 110,500 troops - nearly one percent of the population. A unified national 90,000 strong army is planned to include 18,500 UNITA troops, but in May 1997 only 10,600 UNITA soldiers had been integrated into the national armed forces. A further 24,000 plus an additional 35,000 UNITA troops await demobilisation. [20]

The FLEC troops were estimated to include 500 combatants in 1991. [15]

Every year approximately 105,000 men reach conscription age (20). [20]

Sources

[1] Amnesty International 1991. Conscientious objection to military service. AI, London, UK. [2] Amnesty International 1991. Angola: Human Rights Guarantees in the Revised Constitution. AI, London, UK (AFR 12/04/91). [3] Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1991. Ambtsbericht Angola, 29 November 1991. The Hague, Netherlands. [4] IRBDC 1992. Telephone Interview with Mission of Angola to the USA representative, New York, 20 May 1992. [5] Woods, D.E. 1993. Child Soldiers, the recruitment of children into the armed forces and their participation in hostilities. Quaker Peace and Service, London, UK. [6] Amnesty International German Section 1993. Lagebericht Angola, 31 August 1993. [7] Letter from the Office of the Chief of the General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces to the British Embassy in Luanda, 24 November 1993. [8] UN Commission on Human Rights 1994. Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to Commission resolution 1993/84 (and Addendum). United Nations, Geneva. [9] UNHCR Documentation Centre 1994. Angola - background information on conscription. UNHCR, Geneva. AGO3, 5 April 1994. [10] UNHCR Documentation Centre 1994. Angola - are 'rusgas' still going on? UNHCR, Geneva. AGO2, 5 April 1994. [11] UNHCR Documentation Centre 1994. Angola - Information on punishment for deserters. UNHCR, Geneva. AGO6, 12 August 1994. [12] Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994. Ambtsbericht Angola, 7 November 1994. The Hague, Netherlands. [13] Amnesty International German Section 1994. Letter to Verwaltungsgericht Göttingen, AFR 12-94.550. [14] UNHCR Documentation Centre 1994. Angola - information regarding provisions for conscientious objection. UNHCR, Geneva. AGO11, 16 December 1994. [15] DIRB, 1995 DIRB, 15 November 1995. [16] Federal Office for Refugees of Switzerland 1996. Country Information Sheet Angola. [17] Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996. Ambtsbericht Angola, 25 April 1996. The Hague, Netherlands. [18] Human Rights Watch/Africa 1996. Angola, Between War and Peace: Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses since the Lusaka Protocol. Human Rights Watch/Africa, New York. [19] Diário da República, Serie I, No. 29, 20 June 1997. Angolan Ministry of National Defence - Executive Decree No. 29/97. [20] Institute for Strategic Studies 1997. Military Balance 1997/98. ISS, London, UK. [21] Watch Tower 1998. Letter to Glazer Delmar Solicitors, 27 January 1998. London, UK.

Copyright © 1998-2001 War Resisters' International concodoc@wri-irg.org. ISBN 0 903517 16 7

Child Soldiers: Angola report

Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers

• Has not signed the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
• Population: 11,569,000 Under-18s: 6,049,000 (52%)(1)
• Governmental Armed Forces(2)
• Active: c. 110,500 Army: c. 98,000 Navy: 1,500-2,000 Air Force/Air Defence: 11,000 Paramilitary: 15,000 Rapid Reaction Police: 15,000

National Recruitment Legislation

Article 152 of Angola's 1992 Constitution(3) declares that: "1. The defence of the country shall be the right and the highest indeclinable duty of every citizen. 2. Military service shall be compulsory. The manner in which it is fulfilled shall be established by law." Conscription was reintroduced in 1993 and the former law on military service(4) was replaced by the law 1/93 on 26 March 1993 and its subsequent decree of application.(5) Military service was made compulsory for all men aged between 20 and 45. In the 1996 Decree, the minimum age for voluntary recruitment was fixed at 18 years for men and 20 years for women.(6) In November 1998, the Council of Ministers approved the compulsory conscription of Angolans born in 1981.(7) This means that the minimum age for conscription has been lowered from 18 to 17 years.

National Recruitment Practice

"Between 1980 and 1988, in Angola, every third child has been involved in military operations and many have fired a gun at another human being."(8)

Children have been recruited and used as soldiers throughout the Angolan conflict. After the Lusaka Peace Accord in 1994 soldiers from both government and UNITA forces were officially demobilized. A total of 8,500 child soldiers(9) were registered (children comprised 12 per cent of UNITA troops gathered in the 15 Quartering Areas), but this figure greatly underestimates the scale of the problem since many soldiers had been recruited as children but had reached 18 by the time of registration.(10) By the end of March 1997, only 2,336 child soldiers had been demobilized and over 50 per cent of the total had deserted the Quartering Areas.(11) "I didn't want to join the Army, they made me join", says Francisco, a 17-year-old Private in the Angolan armed forces, as he explains how soldiers burst into his home on a night three years ago in the interior province of Bie and took him away. "All these years, all I have wanted to do is go home. Now finally, I am going back to Bie to see my family and work with my father on his farm." (12)

According to the Government, no one below the age of 18 years is being recruited but non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations operating in Angola testify to the contrary. It is reported, for example, that forced recruitment of youth ('Rusgas') continued even after the reintroduction of conscription in 1993. Such recruitment no longer takes place in Luanda but in some of the suburbs and throughout the country, especially in rural areas.(13) It has been claimed that military commanders have paid police officers to find new recruits. Children as young as 14 have been forced to enlist.(14) It is estimated by one confidential source that there are currently more than 3,000 child soldiers in the Angolan armed forces (FAA), although UNICEF claimed that in 1997 there were 520 children in the FAA.

Following the lowering of the age of conscription in November 1998, the military census of all male Angolans born between 1 January 1979 and 31 December 1981 started on 18 January 1999 after a statement of the Minister of Defence, General Pedro Sebastião.(15) The call-up came the day after UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced his plan to withdraw the UN peacekeeping force from Angola. The young men have been gathered at an office near Luanda Airport to register. Under existing legislation women between 20 and 45 years of age may also be called up, but they are actually not recruited.(16)

It has been reported that wealthy Angolans have sent their children of draft age overseas to avoid army service. Furthermore, corrupt authorities were accepting money in return for official draft exemption, even though the Minister of Defence had publicly declared that "the defence of the motherland is a duty from which no Angolan citizen should be exempted".(17) Angolan news organisations have been specifically warned by a letter from the Minister of Social Communications, not to incite young men to oppose the country's compulsory military draft registration.(18)

One source, requesting confidentiality, has asserted that boys in their early teens are still being rounded up and deployed. There are said to be very high desertion rates for these children, though it is not clear whether they are able to make it home. The same source claims that where very young children are initially recruited, they are 'thrown back' as the receiving military commanders do not want them.

Paido, an Angolan now 24 years of age, described the Angolan style of recruitment in an interview published in the New York Times at the beginning of 1999. "I was walking with two girls. And they called me. I was too close to them, so I couldn't run. Even though my identification card said I was underage - and that was true - I was big, they insisted I was old enough, and they grabbed me and took me to a police station. It was full of kids. (...) " "They put me in a cell with the other kids, while the cops went to get trucks. When they capture you they immediately send you to the provinces for training, far away where you don't know anyone. I was very lucky. A neighbour saw me being taken and told my mother. My uncle is a policeman, and he talked to the station commander. When the rest of the guys were loaded on the trucks, my uncle got me out." New York Times, 20 January 1999.

Child Participation in Armed Conflict

Civil war has been the norm since the independence from Portugal on 11 November 1975. Following a cease-fire agreement in May 1991 (the Bicesse Accord) between the government and the insurgent National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), in October 1992 renewed fighting started in much of the countryside. A second cease-fire agreement, the Lusaka Protocol, was signed between the two warring parties on 20 November 1994. This peace accord provided for the integration of former UNITA insurgents into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). Military integration began in June 1996 and a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation was installed in April 1997. A 7,200-strong UN peacekeeping force (MONUA) was set up to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

In May 1997 the process to extend government into UNITA-occupied areas began, but fighting between UNITA rebels and the FAA continued. As the situation continued to deteriorate a split occurred within the UNITA forces in August 1998 and a new faction calling itself the Democratic Consciousness: Platform for Renaissance and Plural Understanding became semi-public on 2 November 1998.(19) The fighting intensified in November 1998 when the government launched an offensive against UNITA, seeking to capture its headquarters in Andulo and Bailundo.(20) Finally, on 17 January 1999, after the shooting-down of two UN-chartered aircraft in December 1998 and the further increase in the level of hostilities in the country, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan told the Security Council that there was no more peace to keep and that the UN was ending its peacekeeping operations. The 1,000 UN military, police and civilian personnel are expected to be out of Angola by 20 March 1999.

It has been reported that both Namibia and Zimbabwe have sent troops to Angola to back the Angolan armed forces in their offensive against the UNITA rebels, although there are no precise figures on the size of this support.(21) At the same time, Angola has sent troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo to support President Laurent-Désiré Kabila.(22) More recently, Angola accused Zambia and its former Defence Minister, Mr Ben Mwila, of involvement in an illegal support network for UNITA. Mr Mwila angrily denied these charges and asked for tangible evidence of these allegations.(23) On 9 February, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) offered to try to help defuse tensions between the two countries. SADC was prepared only to seek a political solution and would not send a verification mission to Zambia to verify the allegations.(24)

Armed Opposition groups (25)

*Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). It was claimed that some 10,600 of roughly 18,500 UNITA troops had been integrated into the national army and a further 24,000 or so fully-equipped troops plus an additional 35,000 soldiers were awaiting demobilisation.(26) *Following a split within UNITA in August 1998 a new faction called Democratic Consciousness: Platform for Renaissance and Plural Understanding was formed (see above). It was reported that about 4,000 UNITA soldiers had deserted and surrendered their weapons to the Angolan authorities. These men come from the UNITA breakaway faction.(27) *The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC): this opposition group split into many factions which are currently operating within the enclave : the FLEC-FAC (FLEC-Cabindan Armed Forces) and the FLEC-Renovada. Both number about 1,500-2,000. (28)

In 1996, UNITA began demobilizing its child soldiers and had returned 2,000 children to civilian life by January 1997.(29) Yet despite pledging not to recruit children again(30) UNITA has continued to recruit great numbers of children into its ranks.(31) In 1998, the Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development (Afronet) and Human Rights Watch alleged that UNITA was abducting children and young men and women between 13 years of age and their early 30s living in border towns of Cazombo and Lumbala Nguimbo.(32) In addition, it was previously reported that in July and August 1997 Rwandan refugees, including 200 youths, were forcibly recruited when they entered areas of Angola under UNITA control.(33) According to the United States Department of State, in 1998 UNITA conducted forced recruitment, including of minors, throughout all of the country's disputed territory. Recruits were taken to isolated military camps and subjected to psychological stress and extreme hardships; those who attempted to desert were executed. Women, many as young as 13 years old, were recruited forcibly to serve as porters and camp followers, and reports of sexual assault were widespread and credible.(34) It is estimated by one confidential source that the total number of child soldiers in UNITA is currently about 3,000. A number of different sources have also stated that the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave also recruited children into their forces. The FLEC-FAC was reported to have children as young as eight years of age among its ranks (35) and that 30-40 per cent of them were girls.(36) A similar situation is believed to exist in the breakaway FLEC-Renovada.(37)

Notes

The extensive list of notes has been removed. Check their website at www.child-soldiers.org .

Manifesto for Peace in Angola

"The Angolan people want a lasting peace, social justice, good governance and the right of citizenship, and mutual respect for the diversity of people and cultures, which form the Angolan Nation project. these are the fundamental principles for the setting of a common ground among the Angolan people. In essence, these principles are the foundation for in-depth revision of the Nation's concept and valorisation of the Angolan citizenry.

As well as the consensual definition of a vision for Angola and its course towards the future.

Unfortunately, the war is still being used against the Angolan People.

While at the same time those who hold power plunder the country's wealth, in partnership with adventurous outsiders and foreign countries. Oil, diamonds and their revenues are the major source of greed by the rulers, the armed opposition and the oil multinationals, in particular. All with the complacency of countries like the United States, France, England, Brazil, Russia, Portugal and South Africa. Instead of pursuing immediate economic and political interests, these countries can reverse their efforts into a platform of values, contributing, in that way, for the reconciliation of Angolans.

The war in Angola will only come to an end when civil society, the people in general, realise that there is no definitive military solution for the Angolan conflict. People must be aware of the process of destruction in which they are targets, consequently claiming their lives and dignity. What is even more perilous, in this regard, is that the silencing of guns will not mean, by any chance, in the Angolan context, the end of the war. The mentality, specially those of the politicians, ruled by selfish interests, are more armed than the armies under their command.

In the case of Angola, peace has always been seen as the end of fighting, the disarming and demobilisation of the soldiers. This vision, especially harboured by some foreign institutions and internal emotions, is little more than a tranquilliser for those ones who desperately seek true peace.

And a feast for those who serve themselves with immediate peace to profit and to strategically and geopolitically position themselves in the running for the Angolan riches.

We have reached the extreme stage of suffering, social humiliation and the total perversion of the use of power. Hence, we have come to conclusion - a difficult one, because it is elementary and evident in spite of being consensual - that we, the Angolan people, should develop a common ground for the causes as well as for the consequences of the military and political conflict we are facing. It is fundamental that we, the Angolan people, recognise with courage and determination, that we are all accountable for the political and military devastation. As well as the social and economic chaos of the country, whether in an active or passive way. We must as well recognise the serious mistake and abuses committed by ourselves during our historic course.

We, the Angolan people, should take full responsibility for the solution of our own problems. We should not keep on blaming the colonial heritage and/or third parties for our grievances. It is self-pity and a way of self-attesting to ourselves a certificate of incapacity for systematically transferring the resolution of the national conflict to foreign intervention.

Before the verge of total sweltering of the Angolan society, the moment has come for us to act persistently, in a peaceful, courageous and moderate manner, in order to rescue the most sought and deserving treasure for Angolans: Peace through Dialogue. The Angolan people defend peace in that way, while the belligerents assume that the war is the way to reach peace, even if this means the humiliation of one part of the nation by the other, because this war does not have any patriotic sense.

Therefore, we, Angolan citizens, demand that:

1. The government, UNITA and FLEC observe the immediate cease-fire, throughout the national territory,
2. The urgent opening of formal communication lines between the belligerents, through the mediation of the organised civil society,
3. The immediate opening of humanitarian corridors to assist the people affected by the war, especially in the countryside.
4. The government and UNITA, in co-responsibility, include in their military budgets the assistance to deprived people, instead of transferring the burden, of their own war against the Angolan nation, to the international community.
5. The definition of an agenda and schedule for peace talks, by the government (MPLA), the armed opposition (UNITA and FLEC) and organised civil society, for the definitive resolution of the causes of Angolan conflict.
6. The establishment of conditions for the inclusiveness and safe participation of Angolans in the Process of National Dialogue for Peace, throughout the country,
7. The government and the UNITA include in their military budgets the necessary funds to make peace, with patriotism and dignity. Because, if there is enough money to sustain the war, then there should as well be enough money to achieve Peace effectively.

We have decided to fight with persistence and determination for the full accomplishment of our demands and to work actively for the achievement of a lasting peace in Angola, through a patriotic vision of social justice and national equity.

Luanda, June 1999"

(**Contact in Angola: "Manifesto para Paz em Angola", GARP (Grupo Angolano de Reflexão para a Paz), C.P. 6095 Luanda - República de Angola, Fax +244 2 - 340409 or 394865; E-mail: fivilopes@hotmail.com or dantonzi@ebonet.net)

Organisers and list of initial signatories (Name, Age, Profession): Daniel Ntoni-Nzinga (53, Pastor); Carlinhos ZASSALA (52, Professor Ensino Superior); Ana da Concecion Pedro Garcia (41, Sindicalista/Economia ..); Gaspar João Domingos (38, Pastor Evangélico); Francisco Filomeno Vieira Lopes (44, Economista Sonangol); Rafael Marques (28, Jornalista); N. Luisa C. Rogeiro (31, Jornalista)

War Resisters' International 5, Caledonian Road London N1 9DX Great Britain

Phone: +44 20 7278 4040 Fax: +44 20 7278 0444 email: infowri-irg.org

Iniciativa Angolana Antimilitarista para os Direitos Humanos
Initiative Angolaise Antimilitariste pour les Droits de l'Homme
Angolanische Antimilitaristische Menschenrechtsinitiative
Angolan Anti-Militarism Initiative for Human Rights

Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany - founded in November 1998, active since January 1999

The "Antimilitaristic Angolan Initiative for Human Rights" is a anti-war action group by Angolans within and outside Angola and is supported by foreign nationals sympathetic to its aims. We invite new members to join forces and become active in the group.

IAADH is a human rights action group. It works according to the principles of grass-roots democracy. These principles are realized in its organisational structures and are applied to all proceedings and dealings within or outside the group. The initiative sees itself as an antimilitarist or anti-war organization independent of party politics but nevertheless taking sides: It speaks up for the concerns of the agonized people of Angola who have been tormented for decades if not centuries.

We, the founders of the initiative, firmly believe that after more than three decades of armed strife from which noone has emerged victorious nor defeated the use of arms will never resolve the war in Angola. It is precisely this war which lies at the root of the misery on the entire territory of Angola; it is this war which brings about the hunger and the impoverishment of the people who have been heavily traumatised by massacres and expulsion from their native land, by flight and mining of the ground.

Thus we sharply condemn both the continuing warfare and the permanent abuse of humnan rights in Angola. Our initiative will publicly denounce those nations responsible for supplying the eternal warriors with arms or supporting a military decision in favour of on of the warring parties. We call for an immediated stop to all forms of collaboration on their part.

IAADH stands for a new politics in Angola in which all those social groups and organizations participate which advocate a peace process on the basis of human rights and peace education. We furthermore call for a complete revision of the constitution - the laws of which partly date back to colonoal times - in order to equally guarantee and protect freedom and the right to live in security to all citizens within Angola. Finally we call for a complete constitutional ban on every kind of war-promoting propaganda and action, and on all forms of ethnic, political, social, cultural, racial or economical discrimination.

We are a non-violent resistance movement promoting a civil society in Angola. The distribution of firearms to the civilian population for political purposes and for the preservation of power must be stopped, since it turns out to be suicidal for the nation and the population at large.

IAADH believes that conscientious objection which in Angola so far has been persecuted with death penalty or longterm prison sentences is one of the ways in which every Angolan may help to bring about peace. It thus tries to spread the word in its different forms. Our group is convinced: The more men and women publicly declare their unwillingness to fight in a war - and thus refuse to kill in whosoever's name - the better the chances to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and achieve the liberation of the Angolan people.

The Angolan Antimilitaristic Initiative for Human Rights pursues the following objectives:

1. Defense of human rights and basic civil rights for all Angolans in Angola
2. Researching, documentation and publication of violations of human rights committed against Angolans within and outside Angola
3. National and international campaigns to increase sensitivity towards civil and human rights issues in Angola
4. Foundation of national networks within and outside Angola to promote true peace, to fight against war and militarism, and to support peace initiatives and human rights groups in the country
5. Increasing public awareness leading to the foundation of an active pacifist movement and a national initiative for conscientious objectors fighting against compulsory recruitment in Angola; this initiative will be supported by both parents and children who for conscientious, political, religious or other reasons object to military service.
6. Calling for the construction of a radically democratic civil society which clearly separates political parties from the state, which guarantees the rule of law by an independant and impartial judiciary, and which promotes transparency in politics. In particular the IAADH is committed to:
7. the freedom of the press and free expression of opinion and the promotion of an alternative and grass-roots media competence and culture (all citizens regardless of their political, religious, social or ethnic affiliation should have access to the public media)
8. the fight against corruption deeply rooted in Angolan politics; against war criminals and all persons guilty of human rights violations or complicity therein; against rapists and arsenists of all denomination and against the widespread custom of impunity
9. the fight against poverty, misery, lack of tolerance and racism; increasing civil participation in social and political decision-making leading to a humane development in an Angola with a future.

IAADH - (Angolan Antimilitarist Initiative for Human Rights)
Yorckstrasse 59, D-10965 Berlin Germany
e-mail: ari@ipn.de
http://www.snafu.de/~usp/iaadh.htm

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